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has throughout history oppressed Croatia and Croats, it was also possible to argue that history was repeating itself (frequently through historical revisionism) and that Croatia must once again defend itself (MacDonald, 2002 ).
The picture has since then become somewhat ambiguous. For example, in a study focused on the region of Slavonia, Croat respondents were for the most part prepared to reconcile with Serb returnees, other than those who had committed war crimes (Babić 2010: 221) . Eastern Slavonia did feature higher tensions than Western Slavonia in this study, due to the severity of the war there, associated war memories and exacerbated present-day ethnic divisions, but primary social connections in local communities were being gradually rebuilt (Babić 2010: 222) . The intensity and speed at which this was happening differed to Western Slavonia, but coexistence has once again become a part of local social fabric.
The article is based on semi-structured focus groups, dyads and interviews conducted in three Croatian cities (Zagreb, Sisak and Zadar) and several non-urban locations in 2014 and 2015.
Zagreb was used as it is the largest city in Croatia and it remains the political and cultural centre of the country. It also provides an example of a large metropolis that was not on the frontline of the war. Sisak was selected because it was directly affected by the war, a domestic war crimes trial dealt with crimes committed in the city and, as an industrial hub, it has a larger working class population than most cities. Zadar was used since it is in a different region of Croatia than Sisak and was also directly affected by the war. Moreover, the region is known as a hotbed for Croatian right wing, often nationalist, politics. The non-urban locations were determined based on where it was possible to find participants, although an attempt was made (relatively successfully) to keep the locations within a close distance to the three chosen cities, rather than in completely different parts of Croatia.
The groups were organised with middle and high school history teachers, members of smaller war veterans' associations and pensioners. Teachers were selected since they hold a key role in transmitting norms and narratives to younger generations, war veterans since they form a highly influential part of Croatian civil society and pensioners since they had lived through several different types of regimes. Ideally, a focus group was held with each target segment, however, this was not always possible to organise. Three groups (non-urban teachers; nonurban war veterans Slavonia and Zagreb teachers) were, therefore, dyads that were supplemented with further individual interviews. In total 13 focus groups and dyads, with a further four individual interviews, were held with 52 individuals (Figure 1 provides an overview of these). Follow-up interviews were used, when possible to alleviate the risk of the social context of the focus groups from affecting the data, and they were a means to further explore the most interesting opinions expressed. Moreover, a brief survey was handed out to participants prior to each session to allow for comparison to nationally representative survey results. Focus groups were an appropriate primary methodological approach for this type of study since they are good at tackling abstract concepts and investigating issues that could be illuminated by the display of everyday social and cultural norms (Lewis, 2003: 60) . They do not "force" opinions on individuals (such as surveys may do) and they strongly reflect the independence of human opinion by further removing the interviewer from the study (compared to individual interviews) and by focusing on social context, where opinion tends to be created, thereby increasing external validity (Söderström, 2010: 4) . While focus groups allowed for an effective exploration of narratives and opinions that become more apparent through social interaction, their results are limited since they are not representative of the whole population. The results presented here, when not supported by nationally representative data, highlight only how one small segment of the Croatian public construct their view of Croatian Serbs.
Participants in this study differentiated with Serbs predominantly in terms of religion and language. That is not to say that these are the only factors in defining modern, post-war Croatian identity, since the legacy of the Second World War and communism also contribute strongly to the Croatian sense of differentiation with Serbs. These different memories and associated debates have polarised Croatian society and more recent events such as the shouting of "Za dom, spremni" at football matches has highlighted this (Brentin 2016; Pavlaković 2008) . 8 Moreover, human rights abuses from the communist period have been presented as attacks by one ethnicity on another and have never been analysed in a political vacuum, thereby being easily appropriated for nationalistic mobilisation (Subotić 2015) .
National identity in Croatia is, nevertheless, strongly based on religion (Babić 2010; Smith 1991) . Throughout the fieldwork the notion of Croat Catholicism was commonly juxtaposed with Serb Orthodox Christianity. As much as Croats identified themselves as Catholics, they equally strongly identified Serbs as Orthodox. The importance of Catholicism to Croatian identity has been observed among elites and Prcela (2009: 211) has even argued that it has been overlooked as a factor in Croatian identity. 9 This identification stems from the period, when Croatian Catholicism and Croatian national identity merged, as the Church presented itself as the only defender of the Croatian people's collective identity (Jakelić 2010: 118) . In Croatia, as well as in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Catholicism became an identity marker for
Croats (Sells 2003) . It became collectivistic and public; emphasised tradition and ascription;
and, defined group boundaries towards the 'other' (Casanova 1994: 217; Jakelić 2010: 197) .
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During the Homeland War, many volunteers in the Croatian Army saw military deployment as more than just their national duty, but as a religious calling to defend Croatia and in some rural areas facets of Catholicism continue to provide a basis for resistance to centralisation and economic change (Schäuble 2014 ). This union is probably best exemplified in the expression "bog i hrvati" (God and the Croats) that is built on a shared Croat feeling of suffering (Schäuble 2014: 262) . Today, these elements are recurring features in political speeches, religious sermons and in public discourse more broadly.
Language is seen as fundamentally linked with the history of the Croatian people and language is another large differentiator between Serbs and Croats (Fishman 2006) . How people identify themselves is in many ways language and culture specific, so identity can be viewed as a key function of language, equal to those of representation and communication (Joseph 2004) . In order to legitimise modern Croatian language (especially as a language planning project) and a distinct Croatian national identity, Croatian linguistic identity has been presented as reaching far into the past (Langston and Peti-Stantić 2014: 45) . The aims of language planning in Croatia since the 1990s have been exclusively symbolic in order to enhance this identity, in large part because ethnic foundations and identities in the region have been so hotly contested over time ( ibid. 2014: 57) . Language policy was used exclusively in the service of national projects and purity of the language was argued to be essential for the survival of the narod (Kordić 2010: 9 In the 1990s the above-mentioned institutions started to encourage an exclusive view of the Croatian standard language that actively looked to eliminate anything related to the 'East' (Langston and Peti-Stantić 2014: 277) . This exclusivity defined Croatian identity based on religion (Western Christian and Catholic), language (Croatian and not Serbian) and alphabet (strictly not Serbian Cyrillic). Croatian alphabets were defined as Latin, Glagolitic and Croatian
Cyrillic (Horvat 2009: 18) . (1) Gender equality -(6) 79 (7) 80
Peace building (6) 67 (7) 76 (8) 80 Integrity of ownership rights (7) 65 (8) What form of interpersonal contact would you find acceptable with the following groups? To be a member of your family.
Source: Ipsos Puls (2012) What is striking here is not only the negative opinion of Serbs, but of all ethnicities listed. This calls into question the centrality of Serbs, they appear to be liked and disliked as much as other groups. Participants in this study also displayed ambiguous opinions in the survey 
The Serb minority
Throughout all of the group discussions related to Serbs in Croatia, war veterans and pensioners were exceptionally vocal, while teachers were quiet. The two target segments spent much time discussing the Orthodox Church and the current position of Serbs in Croatia, in particular. Across all groups, however, discussion centred on the war and the role of the Croatian Serbs in it. Much of this focused on the notion that there was no expulsion of Serbs from Croatia (that they left willingly), that they committed more crimes than Croats and that they knew the war was coming and were, therefore, prepared for it.
14 All groups felt that Serbs and Serbia had not punished their own criminals the way that Croatia had. Various reasons were given for this, from the strength of nationalism in Serbia to conspiracy theories concerning political elites in the region as a whole:
ZA.T.2 -The problem in Serbia is that it has not come to terms with the role she has played [in the war] and now the current government is quite radically nationalistic… (pauses) They allow them to be Greater Serbs, chetniks, nationalists, this and that (follow-up interview with Zadar teacher). Pensioners and war veterans felt that Serbs, as an ethnicity, were inherently aggressive and hateful. Again, this was closely connected to the predominant war narrative and the feeling that the war is not over. In extreme cases, Serbs were seen as teaching their children to hate.
This was compared to the peaceful nature of the Croat people:
NU.P.4 -Us Croats are that kind of narod. Even though the wounds are deep and it is difficult for someone who has lost someone, but reconciliation will come from our side before it comes from theirs. Although they maybe say it is not so. They are simply that kind of narod.
NU.P.1 -They would wage war now.
NU.P.4 -Yes, they are like that. It is in their blood.
NU.P.2 -Since they teach them to hate (focus group with non-urban pensioners). This is closely related to how respondents viewed the Catholic and Orthodox Churches, the former as peaceful and the latter as aggressive (discussed below). It is also linked to the general view of the Greater Serbian plan. Respondents believed that 'Greater Serbia is an idea that lives on and will live on in many Serbs and generations to come' (focus group with Zadar war veterans) and attempts to introduce Cyrillic signs in in Vukovar were at times seen as an attempt to implement this plan.
Not all comments directed at the Croatian Serb community were negative. Since discussions predominantly focussed on the Homeland War, there were admissions across all groups that Serbs, although only a minority, did fight on the Croatian side in the war. Croatia was by some also seen as the homeland of the Serbs. Teachers generally felt that it was hard for Serbs during the war, while war veterans considered 'good' Serbs to be the ones that fought on the All target segments believed that Serbs overall were manipulated by Greater Serbian politics.
This creates yet another contradiction with the war narrative's notion of exclusively Croat victimhood and Serb aggression. Instead it reformulates it into Serbian state aggression and manipulation of all ethnicities in Croatia, painting them all as victims:
SI.T.1 -The Serb minority currently has a very interesting situation. I think they were manipulated in this whole story. They were a tool of Greater Serbian politics and Milošević used them for his own interests (focus group with Sisak teachers).
On the other hand, the Zadar teachers, for example, thought that Serbs considered themselves to be eternal victims and that they were only affected by the war on the frontline.
Serb returnees were, however, only brought up and discussed by war veterans, who debated the topic at length. They universally saw them as accomplices to war criminals: frequently employed notions of collective guilt, especially since guilt has not been individualised to any significant extent. Moreover, the previously cited Babić (2010: 137) survey found that a majority of the public was only prepared to forgive Serbs who were not.
The combined implication of this is that, if many Serbs are seen as criminals due to their ethnicity (especially returnees), then readiness for forgiveness can be interpreted as low in Croatia.
The forgiving Catholics and the aggressive Orthodox

National and ethnic identity in Croatia is closely linked to religion and the Catholic and
Orthodox churches featured in all group discussions. They were discussed as a source of information on the war and the Catholic Church specifically was seen as educational and reliable. For example, a non-urban teacher believed the Church to be more consistent than any state, since it had been with the Croatian narod for 13 centuries. In many instances, however, the topic was laughed off.
The two churches came up in other parts of discussions as well. These can be divided into four separate categories: opinions about both overall; the Church as a key component of identity; the Catholic church specifically as forgiving; and, the Orthodox church specifically as aggressive. Overall teachers saw all Churches as politically biased (towards the right), political or corrupt, although this did feature some disagreement within groups. Pensioners also discussed the Church, but they were not as critical, while war veterans generally avoided the topic:
ZA.T.2 -The Islamic community, the Serbian Orthodox Church and the Catholic
Church, they all strictly adhere to.
ZA.T.1 (interrupts) -Their Church.
ZA.T.2 -Their flock (laughs). And the innocence of their own narod (focus group
with Zadar teachers). ZG.P.2 -I know it is the Church, but they also receive donations from the state.
ZG.P.1 -Many do, even civil society organisations.
ZG.P.3 -Have you (ZG.P.1) looked at the treaty between the Vatican and our
Church? Do you know how many billions are tied into it?
ZG.P.1 -I do not.
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ZG.P.3 -Do you know how many churches have been built? How much they were shot at?
Moderator interrupts to calm participants down (focus group with Zagreb pensioners).
The last passage highlights the political associations that are at times made with the Catholic Church in Croatia, as well as the potential for disagreement associated with it. The common dissenting view to the above was that the Church has a role, but not a political one. Groups that on the whole disagreed with the above views thought that the role of the Church was purely spiritual:
SI.T.1 -The Church is concerned with spiritual work and not political.
SI.T.2 -And charity.
All laugh (focus group with Sisak teachers). This has the implication that forgiveness, in the eyes of these individuals, is interpreted as religious and specifically Catholic. The would-be sinner must, therefore, ask for it. Given there is a slight preponderance of citizens who believe that the Catholic Church is the predominant moral authority in Croatia (41 per cent agree versus 33 per cent who disagree), this can have far reaching consequences ( Figure 5 ). 
Rights for all, but not for them (yet): Serb minority rights
The special place that the Serb minority holds in Croatia, due to the legacy of the war and the large size of it, was reflected in discussions. Respondents felt that the minority was unique and that it received more rights than other minorities, as well as more rights than Croats in Serbia. The Serb minority was considered unique for a range of reasons: for getting special Passages such as these were common. Veterans complained a great deal about the Law of General Pardon, which they felt gave Serbs special rights, while on the other hand teachers felt that the general Serb population was unique in that a few 'bad apples' had made it difficult for the whole ethnicity to live in Croatia. Generally, however, as in the above passages the ethnic group was often compared to others, especially Italians in Istria:
NU.P.5 -Because they did not stab the Croatian man in the heart or the back. No
Croats attacked these poor Serbs, but they attacked us. But with the Italians it was different. When I was in the army, I was told not to sing the songs about our conquest of Trieste. And we gave Trieste back. There is no more war. In Istria there are many Italians. But they have not hurt Croatia in any way, but the Serbs wanted to put all of Croatia under the boot (focus group with non-urban pensioners).
At times the position of the Serb minority in Croatia was compared to the Croat minority in Serbia and, again, there was a feeling that Croats were worse off than their Serb counterparts.
These comparisons between the Serb minority and other minorities led to a feeling that the Serb minority should not, but does, receive more rights than other minorities. The reasons for this can be divided into four broad categories, each of which features many examples. First, because of what they have done and the legacy of that, so they do not deserve more rights until the country is de-mined or the missing persons are found. Second, because of what they do today, such as voting based on ethnicity. Third, because of what they may do in the future, for example to attack once again (this is connected to the notion that the war is not over).
Finally, they should not receive more rights because Croats in Serbia do not.
Cyrillic
The issue of Cyrillic signs in Vukovar illustrates the inherent contradictions present in how
Croatia and Croats deal with the Serb minority in the country. While nearly all respondents felt that Serbs should have the right to Cyrillic signs, they also felt that it was too soon to put them up in Vukovar. No date was, however, given for when the right time might be.  Ethnic and civic identity were of nearly equal importance, although civic identity ranked higher than ethnic.
 Respondents felt they had the most in common with inhabitants of Croatia, regardless of ethnicity, rather than members of their ethnicity living abroad.
 There was some disagreement over whether ethnicities in Croatia were treated equally (44.3 per cent felt they were, 45.7 per cent felt they were not), although this does not indicate if respondents were unhappy with how Serbs, Croats or any other ethnicity were treated. Results from focus groups and interviews in this study indicate that it may be the case that Croats are being seen as treated unfairly. On the other hand, the regions that felt strongest that treatment was unequal (and therefore answered 'no') were Zagreb, Hrvatsko Primorje, Gorski Kotar, Rijeka and Istria, regions that also displayed the most openness towards Croatian Serbs in the rest of the survey. Slavonia, which on the other hand did not display this, featured the most respondents who felt that treatment was equal. Babić's (2010) longitudinal results further support this difference between the regions.
 Both majority and minority groups were strongly (79.8 per cent) seen as deserving equal rights. In other words, that no one deserved special rights.
 For the most part interethnic relations were regarded as positive or at the very least rarely negative ( Figure 6 ). That is not to say there was consensus among participants or groups on the issue as a whole, but all participants agreed that this policy ought not to be implemented at the time.
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Respondents universally argued that introducing Cyrillic signs in Vukovar and in Croatia more broadly was not the same. Vukovar as the 'hero city' was frequently raised as the reason for why it was too soon to do so:
NU.T.3 -But we all forget that Cyrillic is also a Croatian alphabet. NU.T.4 -Maybe in 50 years in Cyrillic in Vukovar will also not be a problem (dyad with non-urban teachers).
-ZG.T.2 -To me it is absurd that, not to mention so recently after the end of the war, in our hero city they are trying to force this. These are political games, but it is absurd. Horrible (dyad with Zagreb teachers).
At times this was seen as a continuation of the war and an act of aggression. It, thereby, fit into the dominant war narrative:
ZA.T.1 -They are pouring salt on people's wounds. I do not know how someone even came up with the idea to put [the signs] right there.
ZA.T.2 -Someone wrote that law and they knew that is could be used in Vukovar.
Obviously whoever was making this law was not aware of the geography and population, or it is simply a case of negligence.
ZA.T.1 -Yes.
ZA.T.2 -The state is at fault (focus group with Zadar war veterans).
-SI.V.1 -This is a provocation! They are even waging war in peacetime (focus group with Sisak war veterans). The language employed in many of these passages is highly symbolic ('hero city'), accusatory ('this is a provocation'), emotional ('blood from the war has not dried yet') and at times even aggressive ('and then over the Danube'). This highlights the significance of the issue and of the potential for Vukovar and Cyrillic to stir up emotions. As already noted in some of the above passages, the introduction of Cyrillic signs in Vukovar was across all groups seen as the fault of the government and as a political game of some kind. In extreme instances it was seen as a provocation or even an attack from Zagreb:
ZA.V.6 -Cyrillic in Vukovar and Cyrillic in Croatia is not the same thing. Cyrillic in Vukovar is a grenade from Zagreb directed at Vukovar. Zagreb is attacking Vukovar (focus group with Zadar war veterans).
-ZA.P.1 -The blood from the war has not dried yet, from the killing of the people in Vukovar and they are bringing, the Prime Minister is bringing signs with Cyrillic to put on… Even a blind man can see that this is a first class provocation. A provocation (focus group with Zadar pensioners).
All target segments connected the issue of Cyrillic in Vukovar primarily with the Croatian government, at least as the initiator of this effort, and not necessarily with the Serb minority.
Overall it was seen as proof of special treatment of the Croatian Serb community. At times they were seen as a victim to party politics and at other times as an ally of the 'infiltrated' government. Some saw it as a method for politicians to hide real problems, such as the economy, while other saw it deeply mired in party politics and blamed either the SDP or the HDZ:
SI.T.2 -This is political.
SI.T.1 -Against the current government.
SI.T.2 -Yes, the current government is using Cyrillic to annul greater problems than Cyrillic.
All agree.
SI.T.1 -It is cheaper to put up 100 signs than to remove loss making companies and to revitalise economic life.
SI.T.3 -You need to know that here, as soon as big problem arises. One group of war veterans even saw it as a method for preventing Croats from getting jobs.
SI.T.2 -
In this discourse Cyrillic in Vukovar is interpreted as much more than an issue of minority rights, but instead it is seen as a threat to Croatian jobs and as a continuation of the Croatian struggle for independence. Despite that all groups acknowledged Cyrillic was also a Croatian alphabet and formed a part of the Croatian cultural heritage, many nevertheless felt it had been misappropriated and had become dangerous, since it could and was separating people.
Given that both the SDP and HDZ were at times blamed for language problems, it is possible that what started as a 1990s HDZ policy of language change has come to be accepted by the majority of the mainstream political spectrum. The Croatian language and associated alphabets may have become one of the primary sources of national and ethnic identification across the majority of Croatian society.
Conclusion
Participants in the study reflected the notion that Croatian identity is largely defined by religion and language. These elements are contrasted with the 'other' to Croatian identity, Serbs.
Whereas Croats see themselves as Catholic, speaking Croatian and writing in Latin, Serbs and Serbia are seen as Orthodox Christian, Serbian speaking and writing in Cyrillic. This 'other' is also greatly defined by the war narrative, so the Orthodox Church is seen as aggressive, as opposed to the forgiving Catholic Church. Not only were Croats attacked during the war, but also so was the Catholic Church, and general notions of reconciliation are seen as highly based on religion. Croatian identity is, however, based on a much broader set of historical factors and especially the legacies of the Second World War and communism.
Together, they help construct how Croats view Serbs.
All participants agreed on only two notions: that Serbs fought on the Croatian side (and do not, therefore, all constitute the enemy) and that Cyrillic signs should not be put up in Vukovar.
This exemplifies the core contradiction in the Croat view of Serbs. It is, however, worth noting that teachers stood out in their lack of debate on this topic, whereas war veterans and pensioners discussed it at length. The general impression was that Serbs were not seen as deserving more rights, despite respondents expressing openness towards minorities in general. Much of this dynamic was embodied in discussions about Cyrillic signs in Vukovar.
A range of survey results and participants' comments across all groups indicated that ethnic minorities had a right to their own language, but that Serbs could not receive this right in
Vukovar at the present time. This created a stark contradiction between general openness towards minorities, but no openness towards Serbs right now, with no indication of when the time might be right. Participants across many groups, in a discourse that featured numerous facets of the war narrative, interpreted Cyrillic in Vukovar as an aggression against Croatia, instead of as an issue of minority rights. This discourse offered no rational solutions or visions of the future, instead it was dominated by emotion and, in particular, anger.
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This study showed was how a small number of individuals experienced the 1991-1995 conflict, how they remembered it and how this affects their views of the Serb minority in the country.
Some are still reliving the war on a daily basis and, alarmingly, this same group also felt their old neighbours, now back, were all potential perpetrators at worst and witnesses at best.
Participants overall distrusted institutions meant to protect them and, as if by association, also their Serb neighbours, the Serbian state and the Serbian Orthodox Church. Their memories
were not only laced with emotion, they were defined by it.
The ingroup versus outgroup dynamic in this instance has an implication for the Croatian Serb minority in the country, which in the eyes of the majority Croat public continues to be defined by the war narrative. The introduction of Cyrillic signs in Vukovar seems to have had the effect of simultaneously reducing trust in government institutions and making Croats feel threatened by a perceived Serb threat. The implications of this become more dangerous and pronounced in any instance of higher tensions, violence or war, when outgroup membership can become life threatening.
